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Abstract: 
A number of studies show the importance of the underground economy in defining the 
dynamics of migratory flows to southern European countries. A very high number of 
foreign-born workers are employed in the underground economy in Italy. However, by 
no means has the informal economy in the country been created by migrants. Instead, 
the opposite is true. Research demonstrates that it is precisely because the underground 
economy provides a wealth of employment opportunities, that there is a strong 
incentive for migrants to access southern European countries, especially Italy, despite 
the difficulties in gaining regular migration status.  
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The aim of this article is to discuss the role played by the underground economy in 
attracting irregular migration to Northern Mediterranean countries, focusing on the case 
of Italy. Various studies, especially by Emilio Reyneri,1 have underlined the relation 
between migration and a thriving underground economy in southern European 
countries. Looking at the project ‘Migrants’ insertion in the informal economy, deviant 
behaviour and the impact on receiving societies’,2 it is possible to assess the impact of 
these dynamics on host societies. 
Thanks to the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach,3 the project mentioned 
above allowed researchers to reach important conclusions with respect to the following 
aspects of migration: 
 
1) The motivations behind the migrants’ decision to move to receiving 
countries; 
2) The role of the underground/informal economy in offering both 
nationals and non-nationals irregular jobs; 
3) The characteristics of receiving countries as countries of destination; 
4) The relevance of irregular jobs available to both nationals and non-
nationals; 
                                                 
1 Reyneri, “Immigration and the Underground Economy”, “The mass legislation of migrants in Italy”, 
“Illegal Immigration and the Underground Economy", and “Immigration in Italy”. 
2 Reyneri, “Immigration and the Underground Economy”.  
3 Talani, “European Political Economy”. 
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5) The identification of specific pull factors in receiving countries 
attracting both legal and illegal migrants; 
6) The modalities of irregular migration to receiving countries 
7) The existence of job competition between national and non-nationals for 
the same jobs; 
8) The ethnification of illegal activities, meaning the existence of an over-
representation of migrants in criminal activities; 
9) The tendency of migrants to adopt deviant behaviour and the 
motivations behind it.4 
 
Some of these aspects will be discussed in this article with respect to the case of 
Italy to draw conclusions on the impact of a thriving underground economy as one 
amongst other pull factors for irregular migration. Moreover, these phenomena will be 
addressed with an eye to the impact that the Eurozone crisis of 2010/11 has had on 
them.  
The first section will try to quantify the dimensions of the Italian underground 
economy and to assess to what extent the recent events of the Eurozone have worsened 
the situation. In the following section, the focus will be on recent dynamics in Italian 
migration flows, to ascertain to what extent irregular migration is a relevant and 
growing phenomenon in Italy. The last section will deal with the relation between 
migration and the underground economy with reference to the research questions 
underlined above. In particular, the last section of this contribution elaborates on a) the 
inclusion of migrants in the regular and irregular labour markets, in order to verify the 
extent to which migrants pose a competitive threat for local workers; b) the role of 
migrant workers in the underground economy and of the underground economy as a 
pull factor for migration; c) the relationship between the insertion of mainly irregular 
migrants in the underground economy and both their deviant behaviour and their social 
exclusion; d) the impact of these phenomena on the Italian productive structure and e) 
the perception of migrants in the receiving society, as well as its reaction to them. 
Finally, conclusions will be drawn on the challenges and risks that both the 
underground economy and irregular migration present for the Italian economic 
structure. 
 
Quantifying the underground economy in Italy 
Estimates of the size of the underground economy in Italy 
 
Quantifying the size of the Italian shadow or underground economy is not an easy task 
for the evident sensitivity of the issue. Despite this, in the Italian debate different figures 
are proposed.  Before moving to the different estimates of the phenomenon, it is worth 
trying to define what it is meant in the literature by underground economy. 
Friedrich Schneider and Colin C. Williams report that the term “underground 
economy” usually refers to “currently unregistered economic activities that would 
contribute to the officially calculated gross national product if the activities were 
recorded”.5 According to Michael Smith,6 the shadow economy comprises “market-
based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection 
                                                 
4 Reyneri, “Immigration and the Underground Economy”, 1. 
5 Schneider and Williams, “The Shadow Economy”, 23. 
6 Smith, “Can You Imagine? Transnational Migration”, 18. 
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in the official estimates of GDP”. So, broadly speaking, the terms “underground” and 
“shadow” economy can be used interchangeably. The table below provides for a more 
or less consensual list of activities usually included in the broadest definition of the 
underground (or shadow) economy.  
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of types of underground economic activities 
 
 
Source: Schneider and Williams, “The Shadow Economy”, 23. 
 
However, for the sake of clarity, and following Schneider and Williams (2013), 
in this article we will distinguish between the underground economy, understood as 
fitting the broad definition above, and the shadow economy, which excludes illegal or 
criminal activities. According to the conceptualisation of Schneider and Williams, as 
Andreas Bühn et al., 7  the term ‘shadow economy’ has a narrower meaning than 
‘underground economy’: “The shadow economy (…) includes all market-based 
production of legal goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public 
authorities.”8 
Moving to the quantification of the phenomenon in Italy, Andreas Bühn, et al. 
consider the size of the shadow economy, which does not include illegal and criminal 
activities, to have represented around 27 percent of yearly national income on average 
between 1999 and 2007.9  
                                                 
7 Schneider and Williams, “The Shadow Economy”, 25; similarly Bühn, et al., “New estimates for 
shadow economies”, 444. 
8 Schneider and Williams, Ibid. 
9 Bühn et al., “New estimates for shadow economies", 443–61.  
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Figure 1: Italy: Size of the shadow economy 1999-2007 
 
 
Source: Source: Bühn et al., “New estimates for shadow economies", 455–61; author’s 
elaboration. 
 
Eurispes, a private but reputable Italian research institute, 10  has traditionally 
estimated the dimension of the Italian underground economy to be very substantial. In 
its 2016 report on Italy, Eurispes noted that the Italian official GDP of around 1,500 bn 
euros would need be raised by around one third again to account for a shadow economy 
GDP estimated at 540 bn euros. However, this does not include another 200 bn euros 
produced by criminal activities, increasing from the 175 bn euros estimated in 2008. 
Thus, overall the underground economy would amount to half of the national income, 
that is 740 bn euros, at a cost to the Italian state of some 370 bn euros lost through tax 
evasion, based on a current tax rate of around 50 percent. In its conclusion, indeed, the 
research institute talks about tax evasion and the underground economy as a “mass 
phenomenon” in Italy. 
In such a context, irregular labour is thriving. It can, however, take various forms 
and it is therefore difficult to quantify. Irregular work can encompass extra jobs outside 
or even during regular working hours. It may be performed by people who are simply 
outside the official labour markets or by people not allowed to work in official labour 
markets, such as irregular immigrants. 
Moreover, shadow economy work can be full time, part-time, self-employed 
without paying taxes, or any work done without contract when a contract is required, 
from child-minding to bar tending.11 According to Eurispes, the categories of workers 
most frequently employed irregularly are child minders and baby sitters (80%); tutors 
and educators (78.7%); private household workers (72.5% percent). These are followed 
by care-givers, gardeners, builders, plumbers, electricians, wood workers and others. 
In Italy, even medical doctors have an estimated percentage of irregularity of around 
                                                 
 
10 http://www.eurispes.eu/content/listituto-di-ricerca-degli-italiani. 
11 Schneider and Williams, “The Shadow Economy”, Chapter 2. 
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50 percent. Moreover, after the adoption of the Jobs Act in December 2014,12 the 
situation, instead of improving, worsened. According to Eurispes, 28.1 percent of the 
people they interviewed in 2015 admitted to having accepted an irregular job, as 
compared to only 18.6 percent the previous year.  
Recent changes in measurement of the underground/shadow economy may lead 
to the wrong perception of a declining phenomenon.13 As Schneider and Williams 
note,14 because the size of the shadow economy increased in recent years in terms of 
value added, this prompted a number of countries to adjust their national accounts so 
as to include the shadow and, in the Italian case from 2014, also some segments of the 
illegal economy. In the case of Italy, Schneider and Williams refer that the adjustment 
made to the official accounts was between 14.8 and 16.7 percent of national income, 
and this before incorporating the value added of illegal activities, such as drug dealing, 
prostitution and smuggling, into the official numbers.15 This, in turn, means, that the 
estimates of the shadow and underground economy have decreased by more or less the 
same percentage, without, however meaning that they have actually diminished; quite 
the contrary! 
The incorporation of the ‘Non Observed Economy (NOE)’ 16  into national 
accounts is actually supported by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which suggested seven activities that would allow for proper 
adjustments to be made to national accounts.  These are detailed in the box below and 
represent a guideline for national governments.  
 
Table 2: Underground economic activities to be incorporated in official national 
accounts 
 
                                                 
12 In December 2014, the Jobs Act was enacted, eliminating art. 18 of the Statute of Workers  of 1975 
and allowing labour market protection for unfair dismissal in the private sector only in case of 
discrimination over race, gender, political and ideological grounds. In all other instances, even if a 
Court declares the dismissal unfair, workers do not have the right to be integrated in their previous job 
(although they should receive financial compensation). 
13 Furthermore, since the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) is a government institution, its 
estimates are generally more conservative. See http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/175791  
14 Schneider and Williams, “The Shadow Economy”, 144. 
15 Ibid. See also OECD, “Towards a better understanding of the informal economy”.  
16 See ISTAT, “L’Economia non osservata”. 
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Source: OECD, “Better Understanding the Informal Economy”, 14.  
 
Thus, if until the new measurement system was introduced in 2010, the value 
added of the whole underground economy in Italy (as estimated by ISTAT) had always 
been around 20 percent of GDP, in 2013, the value added of the shadow economy was 
estimated to be around 190 bn euros, equivalent to 11.9 percent of GDP. This was an 
increase from 11.7 percent in 2012 and 11.4 percent in 2011. To this has to be added 
the value added of illegal activities, which in 2013 was estimated to be around 16 bn 
1. Not registered  
 
• Producer deliberately not registering – underground (N1): Producer 
deliberately does not register to avoid tax and social security obligations.  
• Producers deliberately not registering – illegal (N2): Producer 
deliberately does not register as a legal entity or as an entrepreneur 
because it is involved in illegal activities. Type N2 excludes illegal 
activities by registered legal entities or entrepreneurs that report (or 
misreport) their activities under legal activity codes.  
• Producers not required to register (N3): Producer is not required to 
register because it has no market output (e.g. non-market household 
producers that engage in production of goods for own consumption, for 
own fixed capital formation, and construction of and repairs to dwellings).  
 
2. Not surveyed  
 
• Legal persons not surveyed (N4): Legal persons not surveyed due to 
reasons such as: the business register is out of date or updating 
procedures are inadequate; the classification data (activity, size or 
geographic codes) are incorrect; the legal person is excluded from the 
survey because its size is below a certain threshold etc.  
• Registered entrepreneurs not surveyed (N5): Registered entrepreneurs 
may not be surveyed due to: the statistical office does not conduct a 
survey of registered entrepreneurs; the registered entrepreneur is not in 
the list of firms available to the statistical office, or is systematically 
excluded from it; the registered entrepreneur is not in the survey because 
the classification data (activity code, size code, geographic code) are 
incorrect.  
 
3.Misreporting 
 
• Producers deliberately misreporting (N6): Gross output is under-reported 
and/or intermediate consumption is overstated, in order to evade income tax, 
value added tax (VAT), other taxes, or social security contributions.  
 
4.Other 
 
• Other statistical deficiencies (N7): Includes data that are incomplete, not 
collected or not directly collectable, and data that are incorrectly handled, 
processed or compiled by statisticians.  
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euros, that is 1 percent of GDP, also up from previous years. Overall, in 2013, the total 
amount of the non-observed economy in the national accounts was estimated to be 
equivalent to 206 bn euros, that is12.9 percent of Italy’s GDP. It must be noted that this 
is only what ISTAT included as an estimate of the NOE in national accounts, and by 
no means comprises all of the Italian underground economy. 
Composition of the underground economy  
In terms of composition, in 2013, 47.9 percent of the value added of the underground 
economy derived from undeclared economic activity. The rest was made up of the value 
added of irregular work (34.7%), by other components such as undeclared rents, tips 
and sales (9.4%) and by straightforward illegal activities (8%).17 In some sectors the 
shadow economy is more established than in others. According to ISTAT, in 2013, the 
shadow economy accounted for 32.9 percent of ‘other activities and services’; 26.2 
percent of trade, transport, hotels and catering; 23.4 percent of the construction sector. 
The weight of non-declared value added for each sector was particularly high in 
professional services, with a share of 17.5 percent in 2013. In building and construction 
this was 14.2 percent and in trade, transport, hotels and catering 13.9 percent. Within 
the industrial sector, the share of undeclared value added was higher in food processing 
and manufacturing of consumption goods (8.3 percent) and less relevant for investment 
goods (2.7 percent).  
There is no doubt that the global financial crisis represented a substantial blow to the 
global economy, leading to wide-ranging and long-lasting consequences. This is true 
also for the case of Italy. 
In the literature there is a tendency to distinguish five stages in the unfolding of 
the global financial crisis.18 If the first stage is clearly represented by the collapse of 
the US subprime mortgage market, this was followed by a credit crunch leading to a 
liquidity crisis. The subsequent phase was a commodity price bubble and finally the 
demise of investment banking in the US.19 
Although the bailing out of financial institutions by national governments all over 
the globe did avoid a global financial meltdown, by that time the global financial crisis 
had already provoked a global economic crisis.20 Just two years after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the global economy had experienced its sharpest ever decline of 
GDP, going from 5.2 per cent to -0.8 per cent.21 This was particularly serious in the 
Euro-zone, where the GDP fell by an unprecedented 9%, from 3.8% in 2007 to -5.2% 
in 2009, with Ireland being the first Euro-zone country to technically enter into 
recession in September 2008. Also Italy went into recession already in 2008, when it 
lost 1.2% of GDP, while in 2009 it lost a substantial 5.1% of GDP22. Finally, the Euro-
area also experienced a sovereign debt crisis starting in Greece, in May 2010, moving 
to Ireland at the end of November 2010, and eventually to the other members of the so-
called PIIGS group (including Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). 
The economic crisis immediately following the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008 seems to have increased the size of the Italian underground economy. 
Already in 2008 the ratio of the underground economy to GDP had increased with 
                                                 
17All statistics from this and the following page are from http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/175791. 
18 Orlowski, “Stages of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis: Is There a Wandering Asset-Price 
Bubble?”. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Talani, “The Global Crash” 
21 Sinn, “Casino Capitalism”, 6 
22 Ibid. 
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respect to 2007. This is particularly evident by looking at the trends of irregular work. 
In 2008, the rate of irregular work, measured as ‘standard units’ (unità lavorative annue 
- ULA) of full time equivalent employment, was 11.8 percent of total employment, that 
is 2.9 million ULA over 24.9 million. However, after 2010 the loss of employment was 
concentrated in the regular labour market, while the irregular ULA remained stable at 
2.9 million. This means an increase in the rate of irregularity of half a point, to 12.3 
percent.  
Developments after the 2010/2011 Eurozone crisis years  
In the years following the 2010/2011 Eurozone crisis the numbers relating to the rate 
of irregular work (measured in ULA as above) kept on increasing, reaching quota 3.5 
million irregular ULA in 2013. This represented around 15 percent of the labour force 
with an increase of 0.5 percent from 2011. Most irregular workers were employees (2.4 
million ULAs).  
The dimensions and dynamics of irregular work are influenced not only by the 
economic business cycle, but also by the legislative context and by the regularisation 
of irregular migrant workers from third countries. The regular component of work 
collapsed in the period between 2011 and 2013, the years of the Euro-zone crisis and 
immediately following it, to the levels of 2000 and 2001: regular ULA moved from 
20.6 million in 2011 to 19.8 million in 2013, representing a total fall of 4.3 percent. At 
the same time, the irregularity rate increased, raising the incidence of irregular ULA 
over total ULA from 14.5 percent in 2011 to 15 percent in 2013. For employees, the 
irregularity rate went from 14.8 percent in 2011 to 15.2 percent in 2013. In the case of 
self-employment, the rate went from 13.9 percent to14.5 percent. 
The highest irregularity rate was registered in the sector of personal and domestic 
services (45 percent in 2013). However very high rates of irregularity were also 
identified by ISTAT in the agricultural sector (17.6%), commercial activities such as 
transport, hotels and catering (15.6%) and construction (15.4%). As for the value added 
deriving from irregular work, this turned out to be especially high in the sector of ‘other 
personal services’ (32.9% in 2013), trade, transport, hotels and catering (26.2% in 
2013) and construction (23.4%). No significant variation was reported with respect to 
previous years. 
The clearest way to assess the extent to which the underground economy has been 
vital for the survival of the Italian economy, especially after the Eurozone crisis, is to 
look at the contribution of the underground economy to the value added as compared 
to the regular economy, sector by sector. 
In 2012, the growth of the underground economy counterbalanced in a significant 
way the negative patterns of total value added in some sectors. In food processing and 
manufacturing of consumption goods, the underground economy contributed positively 
to the total value added by 1.2 percent, while the regular economy lost 5.9 percent of 
value added. In the production of investment goods, the values are respectively +1 
percent for the underground, and -4.5 percent for the regular economy. In professional 
services, the underground economy increased its value added by 1.7 percent, while the 
regular economy decreased by 3.1 percent. In the sectors of agriculture and fishery and 
in the production of intermediate goods, the increase to the total value added due to 
irregular activities added to the increase coming from regular ones (ISTAT 2015). 
In the following year, the contribution to the value added by the underground 
economy compensated the loss of the regular economy in trade, transport, hotels and 
catering. It also contributed positively by 1.1 percent to the growth of the value added 
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in agriculture (total +5.9%), while it was modest (0.1%) and could not compensate the 
total loss in construction (total -4.8%).  
The size of the underground economy may also be inferred through an 
examination of the percentage of irregular immigrants in the labour market. The OECD 
publishes estimates of illegally employed migrants for Italy, which is a sizable 
phenomenon: illegal migrants are estimated to account for 2 percent of total 
employment, with higher figures recorded only in Greece and the US.23  
However, before exploring the relationship between the underground economy 
and irregular migration in Italy, it is worth taking a look at the recent migratory 
dynamics in the country. 
 
Italy and migration: recent dynamics 
 
Italian migratory dynamics have seen important changes recently, creating a scenario 
that is very much influenced by the crisis of the Eurozone. Such a scenario is 
characterised by the following elements:24 
 
• A sizable increase of irregular migratory flows 
• A significant decrease of regular non EU-workers 
• The consolidation of family reunification 
• The increase of Italian emigration 
• The relevant presence of neo-EU citizens 
• The importance of internal migrations 
 
Starting from the first element, while the central Mediterranean route for irregular 
migration has long been an established one,25 what is new nowadays is the increase in 
the number of migrants choosing it. In 2014, this amounted to 170,000, a figure that 
represents a record even with respect to the numbers of 2011, when the country was the 
destination for outflows of Tunisians following the Arab Spring.26 The explanation for 
the upsurge has to do with the chaos created by the Libyan civil war, which increased 
the smuggling of migrants through the Libyan route to reach Italian territory mostly 
due to the elimination of any controls in Libya. 
The central Mediterranean route remained very important in 2015, despite the 
fact that there was a drop of around 10 percent in the total number of migrants arriving 
in Italy to 154,000.27 This was the case as, given the dangers involved in pursuing this 
route, most Syrian refugees, together with Iraqis and Afghans, preferred the Aegean 
Islands’ route, moving to the Balkans to enter the EU through Hungary. The UNHCR 
reports a figure of 450,000 migrants choosing the Balkan route from 1 January to 9 
October 2015, which prompted the harsh reaction of the Hungarian government not 
only to close the border but also to erect a wall to stop refugees from entering its 
territory.28 The unsustainability of the Balkan route led to an agreement with Turkey at 
the end of 2015, that cost the EU 6 bn euros overall, to effectively stop refugees from 
                                                 
23 OECD, “Towards a better understanding”, 42. 
24 ISMU, “Ventunesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni”. 
25 Frontex, “The central Mediterranean route”. 
26 Talani and McMahon, “Handbook of Political Economy of Migration”. 
27 Frontex, “The central Mediterranean route”. 
28 See http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/648269/Hungary-plan-fence-border-Romania-migrants-
refugees-crisis-Viktor-Orban-Schengen  
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being able to cross the Greek border and apply for asylum in Greece in line with the 
terms of the Dublin convention.29 Economic migrants should, in turn, be deported back 
to Turkey. The impact of a similar arrangement on the Italian route was substantial, 
with an increase in irregular migrants reaching Italian shores in 2016 to more than 
181,000.30 
 
Figure 2: Number of illegal migrants using the central Mediterranean route - 
2008-17 
 
 
Source: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/. 
 
This prompted the reaction of the Italian government; the then Interior Minister 
Marco Minniti struck a deal with the Libyan government in Tripoli to limit the number 
of illegal migrants leaving its shores.31  As a consequence, in 2017 the number of 
arrivals fell to the still very sizable number of 119,000. 
Another characteristic of the current migratory patterns in Italy is the reduction 
in the number of third country nationals (TCNs) entering the country legally as workers. 
In 2010, 360,000 non-EU citizens entered Italy with a working permit. Three years 
later, with a drop of 76 percent, only 85,000 migrants entered the country legally to 
work. This variation can be explained primarily by the long-term effects of the 
economic crisis, as Italy is no longer an attractive destination for regular workers. 
Indeed, the Italian labour market does not need more unskilled workers; the already 
weak demand is more than satisfied by the migrants, both regular and irregular, already 
present on Italian territory. This scenario induced the Italian government to reduce 
substantially the number of migrants to be allowed to enter under its quota system (the 
decreti flussi [flow decree]), the priority way for third country regular workers to enter 
Italy.32 In 2017, for example, the number of working permits allowed under the ‘decreto 
                                                 
29 See EU website http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm  
30 Frontex, “The central Mediterranean route”. 
31 For the text of the agreement, see 
http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/02/02/news/migranti_accordo_italia-
libia_ecco_cosa_contiene_in_memorandum-157464439/. 
32 ISMU “Ventunesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni”, 10. 
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flussi’ was only 30,000.33 In a nutshell, regular migration of low-skilled labour is 
progressively being substituted in Italy with irregular migration working, by definition, 
in the underground economy. 
Countering the reduction of legal arrivals for the purpose of work, it is worth 
signalling a third relevant characteristic of the current Italian migratory dynamic, which 
is the increase in legal arrivals for family reunification. Data from the Interior Ministry 
on 31 July 2015 revealed that from a stock of regular migrants of just over 4  million, 
around 30 percent had migrated for family reunification, that is 1,205,412 persons. In 
contrast, 1,410,178 were employees and 241,620 were self-employed. This reveals a 
stabilisation of the migrant communities in Italy and may pose new challenges in terms 
of integration.34  
More striking, however, is a new tendency of Italian migratory dynamics which 
is the direct consequence of the economic crisis: the increase of emigration from Italy, 
of both Italians and foreigners.35 The number of Italians resident abroad is growing: 
from 2006 to 2017, Italian mobility increased by 60.1 percent. From a few more than 3 
million Italians registered with AIRE (Anagrafe italiana residenti estero) in 2006, the 
figure grew to almost 5 million in 2017 – 8.2 percent of the 60.5 million Italian citizens.  
In 2016 alone, 124,076  Italians registered with AIRE (16,547 more than the 
previous year), with no substantial gender differences (55.5 percent males, 44.5 percent 
females). This is actually more than the number of irregular migrants entering Italy in 
2017 (118,962). In 2009, the expats were 37,129, in 2014 they were 73,415 and, in 
2015, 84,560. Of the almost 125,000 Italians emigrating in 2016, 24,771 went to the 
UK, despite the uncertainties relating to Brexit about their status, benefits, and health 
and care provisions. Other popular destinations were Germany (19,178 arrivals) and 
Switzerland (11,759), followed by France (11,108), Brazil (6,829) and the United 
States (5,939). In 2016, Italians also emigrated to Spain, although the number of 
departures was falling (67,738 against 75,765 in 2015) (Migrantes 2017). Eurostat 
(2017) data show that in the period between 2010 and 2015 only Croatia, Hungary and 
Slovenia had a higher rate of emigration in the EU. Of the Italians who decide to go 
abroad, such as engineers and researchers, but also waiters and bar tenders, 62.4 percent 
are unmarried and 31.4 percent are married. More than 39 percent of those who left in 
2016 were between 18 and 34 years old (+233 percent with respect to 2015); 25 percent 
were between 35 and 49 years old (+12.5 percent). Lombardy, (23,000 departures), 
Veneto (11,611), Sicily (11,501), Lazio (11,114) and Piedmont (9,022) were the 
regions with most departures.  
The fifth characteristic of the current migratory situation in Italy is the increase 
in the number of new EU citizens, in particular Romanians. On 3 December 2014, there 
were 1,131,839 Romanian citizens registered on Italian territory, an increase of 36 
percent with respect to 2011. This makes Romanians the biggest foreign community in 
Italy, representing one fifth of all foreign residents. The three new accession countries 
of Romania, Bulgaria and Poland represent 26 percent of all foreigners resident in Italy. 
To these must be added the migrants coming from those countries that no longer need 
an entry visa, such as Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldavia and Bosnia Herzegovina. 
All this favours some sort of circular migration from those countries, with migrants 
coming to work for some time in Italy and leaving thereafter. 
                                                 
33 https://portaleimmigrazione.eu/decreto-flussi-2017/  
34 http://www.interno.gov.it/it/temi/immigrazione-e-asilo/modalita-dingresso. 
35 ISMU, “Ventunesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni”, 11. 
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Finally, the last characteristic of the Italian migratory dynamic is internal 
migration. According to the 2015 SVIMEZ report 36on the economy of Southern Italy, 
between 2011 and 2014 more than 1.6 million people moved from the south to the 
centre and north of the country, while only 923,000 moved back to the south. Internal 
migration mainly involves young people (70%) and skilled labour (40% have a 
university degree). 
The panorama described above shows how Italian migratory dynamics are a 
complex phenomenon, made even more complex by the various legal implications and 
regimes relating to the migratory process. What is of particular interest here is to 
analyse the porousness between the status of regular and irregular migrant which can 
change many times during the migration experience. To this end, ISMU has identified 
ten categories of migrants according to their legal status, which can, however, as 
already underlined, change over time.37  
The tables below detail the categories and number of migrants included in each 
of them for the 2010-14 period. 
 
 
Table 3: Forced migration 
 
YEAR 1. Asylum 
seekers 
1.a Dublin 
Convention 
transfer 
requests to Italy 
2. Obtained 
International 
Protection (% 
of requests) 
2.a Refugees 2.b Obtained 
subsidiary 
protection 
2.c 
Obtained 
Humanitarian 
protection 
3. Rejected 
protection 
requests 
(% of requests) 
2010 12,121 9,673 7,558  
(53.8%) 
2,094 1,789 3,675 5,212  
(37.2%) 
2011 37,350 13,715 10,288 
(40.1%) 
2,057 2,569 5,662 13,470 (52.6%) 
2012 17,352 17,631 22,031 
(73.5%) 
2,048 4,497 15,489 6,455 
(21.5%) 
2013 26,620 22,700 14,392 
(60.9%) 
3,078 5,564 5,750 9,175 
(38.8%) 
2014 63,456 NA 22,013 
(60.7%) 
3,641 8,338 10,034 14,217 
(39%) 
Source: ISMU 2016:306-310 
 
 
Table 4: Voluntary migration 
 
YEAR 4. Non-EU 
Workers 
4.a Seasonal 
workers 
5. Non EU students 6. Long-term 
residents 
7.Unaccompanied 
minors 
8. Family re-
unification 
9. EU 
migrants 
2010 358,870 22,411 NA NA NA 178,797 NA 
2011 124,544 15,426 31,295 1,638,734 NA 140,846 1,211,755 
2012 70,892 9,950 31,005 1,896,223 7,575 116,891 1,240,157 
2013 84,540 7,587 27,321 2,045,662 8,461 105,540 1,441,706 
2014 NA NA NA 2,179,607 10,536 NA 1,491,863 
2015 
(to 31 Sept  
2015) 
NA NA NA NA 8,944 NA NA 
Source: ISMU 2016:310-318 
 
 
Table 5: Irregular Migration 
 
YEAR 10. Estimated irregular migrants 
2009 422,000 
2010 454,000 
2011 443,000 
                                                 
36 SVIMEZ report, 2015  
37 ISMU 2016: 306 
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2012 326,000 
2013 294,000 
2014 350,000 
2015 404,000 
Source: ISMU 2016:319  
 
 
 
Of these categories, the one that includes the highest number of migrants, apart 
from the categories of long-term residents and EU citizens, is that of irregular migrants. 
They are defined as non-EU citizens living in the territory of an EU member state 
without satisfying the legal conditions for residence (ISMU 2016:319).   
Below we analyse the implications of irregular migration for receiving societies 
as well as the relationship between irregular migration and the underground economy. 
 
The relation between irregular migration and the underground economy and its 
implications for receiving societies 
 
Based on statistical data and on the insights of ISMU reports,38 a few conclusions can 
be drawn for the case of Italy with respect to some important aspects of the relation 
between the underground economy and irregular migration as underlined in the relevant 
literature.39 As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in a) the inclusion of 
migrants in the regular and irregular labour markets, in order to verify the extent to 
which migrants pose a competitive threat for local workers; b) the role of migrant 
workers in the underground economy and of the underground economy as a pull factor 
for migration; c) the relationship between the insertion of mainly irregular migrants in 
the underground economy and both their deviant behaviour and their social exclusion; 
d) the impact of these phenomena on the Italian productive structure and e) finally the 
perception of migrants in the receiving society, as well as its reaction to them. 
 
The inclusion of migrants in the regular and irregular labour markets 
With respect to these issues, it is worth noticing that during the years of the global 
financial crisis and the crisis of the Eurozone, the number of migrants that were active 
in the Italian labour market increased dramatically.40 Looking at the manufacturing 
sector, for example, migrants, employed both regularly and irregularly, have had a very 
relevant role in the generational turn-over of the labour force. They allowed for the 
survival of a number of companies which had lost competitiveness because of the lower 
level of skills and related inferior costs of the migrant workers. This can contribute to 
explaining why, in the years immediately before the crisis, the Italian manufacturing 
sector saw a higher increase in value added than the service sector, which requires more 
skilled personnel.41 The reason is that, as further elaborated below, migrants, both 
regular and irregular, usually have a lower level of skills and education than Italian 
workers.  
From this point of view, there was no competition between the Italian work force 
and the migrant one. However, these dynamics did accentuate one of the most 
                                                 
38 ISMU, “Ventunesimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni”. 
39 Reyneri, “Immigration and the Underground Economy”, “The mass legislation of migrants in Italy”, 
“Illegal Immigration and the Underground Economy", and “Immigration in Italy”. 
40 Zanfrini, “Il Lavoro”, 103-19. 
41 De Arcangelis et al., Migration, Labor Tasks and Production structure. 
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detrimental characteristics of the Italian productive model, namely the substantial 
demand for low-skilled labour.  
Looking at the figures relating to the educational level attained by immigrants in 
comparison with the local population, it is evident that, even though the educational 
level of the Italian working force is not particularly high, certainly not in comparison 
with other EU and OECD countries, the educational level of the migrant population is 
even lower. Indeed, Italian immigrant distribution per level of education shows that the 
share of immigrants with low education is more than 11 percent higher than that of the 
local population in 2015, up from 7 percent higher in 2010.42 
In contrast, Italy fails to attract highly educated migrants (-10 percent than local 
population in 2015, while it was only -5 percent in 2010).43 This dynamic inhibits 
improvements in terms of innovation and competitiveness,44 which are crucial factors 
for competing in the global political economy over the medium and long term.  
Although irregular migrant employment, as we have seen above, does exist in the 
Italian manufacturing sector, (unlike in the manufacturing sectors of the other southern 
European countries),45 it is in the personal and domestic service sector where irregular 
migrant workers are most commonly employed.46 This is also one of the sectors where 
the economic crisis has had the most impact, meaning that has increased the number of 
irregular migrants workers, due to the growing difficulties faced by Italian families and 
the related need for them to rely on low-cost solutions for their domestic and personal 
services.47 However, at the same time, it is also interesting to notice an increasing 
number of Italians being employed, regularly and irregularly, in these domestic support 
roles. This testifies to the increasingly dire situation of the Italian economy. 
In the agricultural sector, during the economic crisis migrants came to constitute 
more than 14 percent of the total work force. This is three times the level that they 
occupied before the crisis. Furthermore, although it is true that a small number of native 
workers have since moved to the agricultural sector, it is very likely that the number of 
immigrants employed in it will continue to be substantial. The estimates of 
Unioncamere put the percentage of immigrants required in the sector at between 23 
percent and 32 percent of permanent workers. However, it is in seasonal activities that 
migrants are mostly required, with an estimate of 300,000 considered necessary during 
2014. It is worth underlining that, especially in southern Italy, where migrant labour is 
mostly involved in picking fruit and other agricultural products (49 percent of total), 
they are overwhelmingly employed irregularly and their working conditions are far 
below the norm and the threshold of acceptability.48 This, in itself, is a guarantee that 
competition with the local working force is limited. 49 
Moreover, these poor working conditions can often be coupled with the activities 
of organised crime. This is the case not only in the employment of irregular workers, 
but also in the smuggling and trafficking of irregular migrants. It surely exacerbates the 
problems of coexistence within interethnic communities. 
As far as independent employment is concerned, it was only thanks to ethnic 
entrepreneurs that Italy’s entrepreneurial communities could grow during the crisis 
                                                 
42 OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2014” and “Statistics”. 
43  Ibidem. 
44 Zanfrini, “Il Lavoro”, 103. 
45 Reyneri, “Illegal Immigration and Underground Economy”. 
46 Zanfrini, “Il Lavoro”, 104. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 106. 
49 Zanfrini, “Tra cibo e Terra”, 329-58. 
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years. In 2014, the number of companies with at least one owner born outside the EU 
reached 335,452. This trend reinforced one of the most detrimental characteristics of 
the Italian productive system, which keeps companies at a small, even micro-level with 
lowers costs but also profits and skills. Indeed, 8 out of 10 companies owned by 
migrants are individual ones, benefitting from low access barriers for sectors with 
problems in generational turn-over.50 For these reasons, again, competition with local 
workers is not an issue, although the lack of a strong entrepreneurial culture among 
migrant communities and the low-cost/low-skill model of their individual companies 
constitute a real problem for the future (and present) competitiveness of the country. 
Summing up, the insertion of third country nationals in the Italian labour market 
does not seem to have brought about competition with the native working force. 
However, it has reinforced the most embedded tendencies of the Italian labour market, 
in particular, the dualism between the North and the South of the country and 
porousness between the formal and the underground economy.  
With respect to the north/south divide, foreign born workers in northern regions 
face similar labour conditions as the native population, as the majority of regular 
migrants (two-thirds) are employed in Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Lombardy. In the 
south, on the contrary, foreign-born workers, both regular and irregular, both EU 
citizens and third country nationals, are almost all invariably employed in the 
underground economy, especially in the agricultural sector.  
This does not mean, however, that irregular work exists only in the south of Italy. 
Everywhere in Italy immigrant workers are employed irregularly, thus degrading the 
life and working experience of the migrants. Thus, the modalities of inclusion of 
immigrants in the Italian labour markets do not seem to pose a competitive threat to the 
local labour force but do seem to exacerbate a pattern of discrimination, exclusion and 
marginalisation of foreign communities. Moreover, they make the problems of the 
Italian labour markets and productive structure more ingrained and difficult to 
eradicate.51  
 
The underground economy as a pull factor for migration  
 
A number of studies show the importance of the underground economy in defining the 
dynamics of migratory flows to southern European countries.52 As we have seen above, 
a very high number of foreign-born workers are employed in the underground economy 
in Italy. However, by no means has the informal economy in the country been created 
by migrants.53 Instead, the opposite is true. Research demonstrates that it is precisely 
because the underground economy provides a wealth of employment opportunities that 
there is a strong incentive for migrants to access southern European countries, 
especially Italy, despite the difficulties in gaining regular migration status.54  
As a consequence, it can  be claimed that there is a vicious circle between 
irregular entry and permanence in a country, and employment in the irregular labour 
                                                 
50 Zanfrini, “Il Lavoro”, 105. 
51 De Arcangelis et al., “Migration, Labor Tasks and Production structure”. 
52 Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, “Immigrants and informal economy”. See also Reyneri, “Mass 
legalisation of migrants”, 84.  
53 See Reyneri, Ibid. 
54 Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”, 21; Kosic and Triandafyllidou, “Albanian and 
Polish Migration to Italy”; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, “Immigrants and informal economy”. 
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market. 55  With reference to Italy, it is widely recognised that the overwhelming 
majority of labour immigrants enter Italy without a valid working permit and outside 
the quota system.56 Various regularisation schemes have allowed irregular migrant 
workers to regularise their status with almost 1,500,000 migrants having applied during 
the five regularisations between 1986 and 2002.57 However, in 2004, two-thirds of 
documented immigrants were estimated to have spent some period of time as 
unauthorised residents.58 And despite the periodic regularisation drives, figures show 
that just a few years later the pool of irregular workers has grown again, mainly due to 
more entries.59 
The modalities of entry into the country in turn, are very complicated (Talani 
2015). Lacking a valid working permit, entry can be clandestine, with or without the 
help of organised crime, or it can be legal, with a tourist or a student visa. These visas, 
however, usually have a very short time limit and do not entitle the holder to work in 
the destination country. Thus, people overstaying may look for a job after entry, but 
their status would not be regular. Finally, entry is allowed for family re-unification 
purposes, as seen above. So, gaining regular residence status in Italy is very difficult. 
What is most important to stress, though, is that unauthorised residence and irregular 
work very often go together.60  
The size of the underground economy acts as a catalyst promoting unauthorised 
immigration. The mechanism enabling this to happen has been detailed clearly in the 
literature.61 If the modalities of entry into a country which has adopted strict migration 
policies require the acceptance of very high costs and risks, migrants who generally 
want to improve their living standards will be more likely to choose countries offering 
more opportunities to employ them despite their irregular residence status. This means 
that unauthorised migrants are more likely to choose countries which can offer them 
easy access to the irregular labour market, as they would not be allowed to enter the 
formal market in any case. Consequently, the bigger the irregular labour market and the 
stronger the underground economy, the higher the incentives for an undocumented 
migrant to enter the country. Various studies report that Italy has been widely perceived 
by migrants as a place where it is easy to find a job even without a proper permit.62 
Some migrants even declared they were more motivated to enter Italy instead of, for 
example, Greece, because the amount of money to be earned in the Italian underground 
economy was higher and it was easier to become involved in it.63 Even though the 
conditions of migrant workers, especially those employed in informal agricultural work 
in the Italian south, live well below the standards of decency and acceptability, and 
sometimes even physical safety,  this does not seem to dissuade migrants from moving 
to Italy. Evidence gathered through interviews has underlined how migrants finding 
themselves living in dire conditions in the host country rarely consider the option of 
returning to their home countries. Moreover, they often seemed convinced that their 
                                                 
55 Reyneri, Ibid., 20-2. 
56 Reyneri, “Immigration in Italy”. 
57 See also Reyneri, “Mass legalisation of migrants”, 88. 
58 Blangiardo, “I processi di immigrazione”. 
59 Reyneri, “Mass legalisation of migrants”. 
60 See also Zincone, “Illegality, enlightenment and ambiguity”, 43-83. 
61 Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”; “The mass legalisation of migrants”; “Illegal 
Immigration and Underground Economy”; and “Immigration in Italy”. 
62 Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”; Kosic and Triandafyllidou, “Albanian and 
Polish Migration”.  
63 See Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”, 24. 
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negative experience would hardly make their friends and relatives back home change 
their mind about migrating themselves.64 The migration process is a self-fulfilling one; 
migration leads to more migration regardless of whether the migratory process was 
successful or not and whether returning migrants communicate their experience to their 
peers. This is consistent with theories of migration as a social process.65 According to 
this theoretical approach, in the first phase of the migration process, the Homo 
Oeconomicus phase, the immigrant is not interested in his/her standard of living in the 
host country because their stay is viewed as temporary and mainly aimed at achieving 
economic advantages. Moreover, the Homo Oeconomicus is very unlikely to go back 
to the home country without money if their migration experience results in failure. 
These conditions make it more likely for the migrants to accept being involved in illicit, 
if not even illegal, activities in the host country. Doing so would allow them to prolong 
their stay in the country despite having to face uncomfortable or dangerous situations. 
These factors support the idea that the underground economy is a pull factor for 
irregular migration to the EU, especially in the context of the strict limits on migration 
from third countries within the framework of ‘Fortress Europe’66. In a nutshell, readily 
available employment in the underground economy, where no documents are required, 
promotes undocumented immigration. 67  There is a feedback loop between the 
underground economy and irregular migration: without the first, the second would 
hardly be possible or, at least, it would be much smaller. 
This conclusion is further strengthened by the evidence that the majority of the 
migrants do not come from the poorest countries, but from those with an intermediate 
level of development and have therefore enough information and resources to go 
looking for a better life abroad.68 This means that, more than finding a way to survive, 
they are looking for better living standards, closer to the idea of the West portrayed by 
the media. That these expectations are not necessarily met, if ever, is beside the point. 
What counts is that the motivation to migrate is based on them69.  
 
The link between irregular migration, deviant behaviour and Italians’ attitudes 
toward migrants 
Finally, the insertion of the vast majority of immigrants into the underground economy 
may have contributed to the negative attitude of Italians towards not only economic 
migrants but also asylum seekers and refugees. From a survey by ISPI-RaiNews, 
carried out by Ipsos, an alarming picture of the attitude of Italians vis-à-vis immigrants 
emerges:70 25 percent of the interviewees considered immigration the biggest threat for 
the country, even more than Islamic terrorism (21 percent).71 Regarding the value of 
migration for Italians, only 2 percent of the interviewees believed it to be positive, 
whereas a staggering 67 percent believed immigration to be a threat. Only less than 30 
percent believed it was an inevitable phenomenon, which needs to be managed properly 
(Table 6). 
 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Talani, “From Egypt to Europe”. 
66 Talani, “European Political Economy”. 
67  Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”, 21. 
68 See Rowlands, “Poverty and Environmental Degradation”. 
69 Talani, “From Egypt to Europe”. 
70 ISPI, RaiNews, Ipsos, “Gli italiani e le migrazioni”. 
71 Valtolina, “Gli Italiani e l’Immigrazione”,  151. 
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Table 6: Immigration as a threat for Italy (% values) 
 Percentage  
Yes, it is a threat and it is connected to terrorism 38 
Yes, it is a threat but it is not connected to terrorism 29 
No, it is not a threat it is a positive thing 2 
No, it is not a threat and it is inevitable 28 
Don’t know 3 
Source: ISPI-RaiNews, “Gli italiani e le migrazioni”.  
 
According to the Italians interviewed by the survey, the best way to deal with 
migration would be a strong intervention to repatriate migrants, even using the military 
(39%). A similar percentage considered it best to negotiate with transit countries to 
prevent migrants from entering Italy. It should be noted that only 16% of Italians 
considered it necessary to host refugees, although this attitude changed slightly after 
Pope Francis summoned each parish in Italy to host a family of refugees (Tables 7 and 
8). 
 
Table 7: The best way to address immigration 
 Percentages 
Military intervention 17 
Repatriation 22 
Negotiations with transit countries 39 
Host refugees 16 
Do not know 6 
Source: ISPI-RaiNews, “Gli italiani e le migrazioni”.  
 
 
Table 8: Assessment of Pope Francis’ request for each parish to host a family of 
refugees 
 Percentages 
Very positive, this could be an example for the government 25 
Positive, the Catholic Church cannot be indifferent 45 
Negative, it is not the role of the Catholic Church 9 
Very negative, it is instrumental and does not solve the 
problem 
15 
Do not know 6 
Source: ISPI-RaiNews, “Gli italiani e le migrazioni”.  
 
 
Another survey by Demos and Pi, of June 2015, confirmed that Italians were 
generally very worried about migration, especially in terms of security (42%). This 
percentage is the same as in 2007. Moreover, around 35 percent thought that 
immigrants were a threat for employment.72 Finally, a survey by SWG in April 2015 
pointed out that the majority of Italians interviewed would like to see the flow of 
immigrants drastically reduced. 
 
                                                 
72 Ibid.,156. 
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Table 9: How should migrant flows be regulated in Italy? 
 Percentages 
Drastically reduced 57 
Slightly reduced 18 
Maintained as they are 10 
Slightly increased 3 
Drastically increased 2 
Do not know 10 
Source: Swg 2015 
 
As the figures clearly demonstrate, Italians have had a constant attitude of 
mistrust with respect to immigrants, especially in terms of security, but also regarding 
their role in limiting the employment opportunities of local workers. Of course, entering 
the country irregularly as well as having to go underground to support their stay in the 
country can only hugely increase both their marginalisation from the host society and 
the emergence of a negative attitude towards them by local people.  
The analysis by Reyneri traces back the reasons why this happens.73 In primis, 
insertion in the underground economy makes the immigrants appear to be criminals and 
limits the possibility for them to be recognised as positively contributing to the general 
welfare of the host society. This is exacerbated by the fact that, due to being irregular 
workers, they do not pay taxes and social contributions, but they do have access to 
public goods such as schools, hospitals, or even water and streets. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that Italians share a general acceptance of irregular labour markets, particularly 
because they are themselves often employed in them, immigrants are highly stigmatised 
if they do the same. On the one hand, this is the case because in-group free riders are 
more tolerated than out-of-group free riders. On the other hand, there is the belief that 
migrants involved in the underground economy are more likely to become criminals.74  
But is this true? Do immigrants really adopt deviant behaviours more than the local 
population? Given that law 94 of 2 July 2009 made illegal migration a crime in itself, 
it is hard to compare statistics. However, careful analysis of how criminal statistics are 
constructed and the proceedings of police activities and penal trials, allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of the extent to which migrants are discriminated against.75 The 
introduction of the new law on illegal migration caused a short circuit of securisation,76 
which made it more likely for the authorities to privilege repressive actions at the 
expense of support to migrants. In simple statistical terms, though, the jailed population 
has increased in general, but this is particularly true for foreigners. This gave rise to 
what is called in the literature a phenomenon of ‘ethnification’ of the jailed population, 
which conceals an ethnification of crimes.77 
The table below shows that foreigners represent 33.6 percent of the total jailed 
population in Italy, with some regions, such as Trentino Alto Adige, reaching more than 
70 percent. 
 
Table 10: Jailed population in Italy including foreigners, 30 April 2016  
                                                 
73 Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”. 
74 Ibid., 26. 
75 See Palidda et al., “Les Conduites Deviantes”, 123-83. 
76 See Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”, 26. 
77 See Reyneri, “Immigration and Underground Economy”, 27. 
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 N. Institutes 
Total 
Places Total jailed Women Foreigners % foreigners 
ABRUZZO 8 1,587 1,717 74 225 13.1 
BASILICATA 3 470 485 7 112 23.1 
CALABRIA 12 2,657 2,554 55 449 17.6 
CAMPANIA 15 6,106 6,755 344 843 12.5 
EMILIA ROMAGNA 11 2.8 3,094 131 1,510 48.8 
FRIULI VENEZIA 
GIULIA 5 484 631 13 240 38.0 
LAZIO 14 5.26 5,889 381 2,639 44.8 
LIGURIA 6 1,109 1,374 77 726 52.8 
LOMBARDY 18 6,125 8,077 388 3,757 46.5 
MARCHE 7 853 867 19 283 32.6 
MOLISE 3 263 310 0 56 18.1 
PIEDMONT 13 3,842 3,665 129 1,607 43.8 
APULIA 11 2,358 3,103 141 437 14.1 
SARDENIA 10 2,632 2,051 55 425 20.7 
SICILY 23 5.9 5,789 117 1,237 21.4 
TUSCANY 18 3,406 3,320 121 1,558 46.9 
TRENTINO ALTO 
ADIGE 2 506 450 15 331 73.6 
UMBRIA 4 1,336 1,304 36 398 30.5 
VALLE D'AOSTA 1 181 185 0 112 60.5 
VENETO 9 1,704 2,105 110 1,129 53.6 
Total Italy 193 49,579 53,725 2,213 18,074 33.6 
Source: Justice Ministry website:https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14_1.wp?previsiousPage=mg_1_14&contentId=SST1232346 
 
Although many explanations can be found for this trend, the fact that 
undocumented migrants end up working in the underground economy may indirectly 
contribute to an increase in deviant behaviour among migrants. There is also a self-
selection process linking deviant behaviour and employment in the shadow or illegal 
economy. Clearly, people who engage in risky and illegal ways of entering a country 
without the proper documents and who then are willing to make a life in the 
underground economy are generally more prone not to respect the rules. This might 
also include engaging in straightforward illegal activities, as these are the activities that 
pay the most. Another element that should not be underestimated is that sometimes 
migrants are inducted to crime by the same people who smuggle them into the receiving 
country, sometimes with the aim of being repaid the debt they incurred to migrate. 
Finally, the fact that the receiving country, Italy in this case, offers easy unauthorised 
entry and easy irregular work may give migrants the impression that it is not necessary 
to respect the rules.78 
Thus, we can conclude that the characteristics of migration processes in Italy are 
such that they tend to pre-select migrants who are willing to enter the country 
irregularly and to work in a well-established and thriving underground economy. In 
turn, the existence of such a flourishing non-emerged sector acts as a catalyst for illegal 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
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migration, representing a significant pull factor for migrants in general and sans-papiers 
in particular. However, the downside of this easy access to irregular or even illegal 
activities is the difficulty for migrants to really integrate in the host society and their 
increasing marginalisation, which may incentivise them to increase their deviant 
tendencies. Of course, one solution to all this would be to curb the underground sector 
in Italy but, as noted in this article, even assuming that the various Italian 
administrations have really been willing to do so, they do not seem to have been 
particularly successful. 
 
Conclusion 
Italian problems of competitiveness are not only linked to macro-economic dynamics 
but also derive from some deeply engrained socio-economic phenomena. One of the 
most serious is the growing importance of the underground economy, which includes 
both the informal shadow economy and the illegal one. 
Given that the OECD has strongly backed the inclusion of the non-emerged 
economy into countries’ official accounts, the estimates provided by reputable Italian 
research institutes such as Eurispes note that the size of the Italian underground 
economy is currently half of official GDP. This is a frightening figure, which conceals 
the dualist nature of the Italian economy. 
One of the largest components of the underground economy is irregular 
employment, especially in personal and domestic services, and agriculture, although 
irregular jobs are available even in the manufacturing sector in Italy, contrary to other 
southern European countries. In spite of the liberalisation of the labour markets carried 
out in the last decades under the auspices of the EU and other international 
organisations, the rate of irregularity of the Italian labour markets has actually 
increased. 
If it is a fact that irregular employment is widespread throughout the peninsula 
and involves mostly Italian workers; it is also a fact that the vast majority of migrants, 
and certainly all irregular ones, find work only in the underground economy. This is 
especially true for irregular migrants working in the agricultural sector in the Italian 
South, where the working conditions, very often controlled by organised crime, are 
unacceptable to say the least. 
However, notwithstanding the dire conditions in which immigrants find 
themselves in the Italian underground sectors, this actually represents a strong pull 
factor for irregular migration into the country. It is indeed plausible that immigrants 
who are prepared to undergo risky and costly migratory processes, often with the help 
of organised crime, are more likely to prefer those countries with easy access to the 
irregular labour market and, therefore, with thriving and well established underground 
economies. However, if this is an incentive for them to enter Italian territory irregularly, 
it is also at the root of their marginalisation from Italian society, and increases their 
likelihood to ‘misbehave’. 
Overall, relying on cheap, unskilled immigrant labour, often of an irregular 
nature, does not help Italy increase its competitiveness in the global political economy. 
Instead, this exacerbates the more unfavourable characteristics of the Italian productive 
structure, such as the very small dimensions of its companies, the lack of innovation 
and the low skill and low technology content of its production. These, perhaps, are the 
real causes of its continuous decline, as well as its more recent acute crisis. 
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